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“Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of 
men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they 
confuse with absolute truth.”   —Simone de Beauvoir1 
 
For the past forty years, feminism has provided an important 
paradigm through which to critique modernity.  A feminist analytical 
lens allows us to view social action and policy making differently and 
to uncover underlying assumptions about social action.  However, in 
part because of the backlash Susan Faludi wrote so eloquently about 
in the early 1990s, the “F” word is not used much outside academic 
circles.2  For many, feminism evokes the image of a bra-burning, man-
                                                          
∗ Debora Halbert is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Otterbein College 
located just outside Columbus, Ohio.  She has written articles on intellectual property 
issues, and is the author of Intellectual Property in the Information Age: The Politics 
of Expanding Property Rights (Quorum 1999).  She has recently completed her 
second book, Resisting Intellectual Property (Routledge 2005). 
 1. SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST 
REVOLUTION 176 (1970) (quoting the famous French feminist’s assertion that society 
itself is male). 
 2. See, e.g., SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN 
WOMEN, at xix-xxiii (1991) (concluding that the latest backlash against feminism is 
part of a pattern of backlashes throughout American history triggered by a 
perception of great advancement of women’s rights).  The use of the term the “‘F’ 
word” is widely disseminated in feminist literature and is used to describe the way the 
backlash against feminism has made it into a dirty word.  Id.; see The Infamous F-
Word, http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~elk/feminismquotes.html (last visited July 26, 
2006) (linking “the F-word” to common quotes about feminism); see also Amy 
Richards & Julie Parker, The F-Word, NEW INTERNATIONALIST (1995), http://www 
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hating radical.  For many more, to the degree a feminist movement 
was ever necessary, there is no need for it anymore.  Anyone who has 
studied feminist thought understands that not only is the stereotypical 
image of a feminist inaccurate, but there are continued benefits from 
a feminist analysis of issues.  Furthermore, there is no single feminism 
that can claim to speak for all women who call themselves feminists.  
Feminist thought aligns loosely around themes regarding women’s 
equality,3 but the multiplicity of feminism(s) at times overshadows the 
similarities.4 
In part because significant differences exist between the many 
varieties of feminism, feminist thought has blossomed into a complex 
tapestry of perspectives.5  Offering a feminist interpretation can 
disrupt conventional understandings with questions about male 
domination and the uncertainty of truth.  Creating a feminist 
epistemology, a feminist critique, a feminist standpoint, or simply 
legitimating “women’s ways of knowing”6 provides insight into power, 
social structures, and theory that would otherwise be missing.  In 
other words, while there are many feminist avenues for critique, 
applying a feminist framework gives us a different way of looking at 
the world.7 
                                                          
.newint.org/issue270/fword.htm (discussing the issues surrounding young people 
and the term feminism). 
 3. See JUDITH GRANT, FUNDAMENTAL FEMINISM: CONTESTING THE CORE CONCEPTS 
OF FEMINIST THEORY 42-43 (1993) (arguing that while it may be possible and necessary 
to identify core feminist concepts, contemporary feminism is diverse and 
contradictory). 
 4. See Sandra Harding, Conclusion: Epistemological Questions, in MODERN 
FEMINISMS: POLITICAL, LITERARY, CULTURAL 319, 319-21 (Maggie Humm ed., Columbia 
Univ. Press 1992) (1987) [hereinafter MODERN FEMINISMS] (suggesting that a unitary 
feminist theory is unlikely given the importance of women’s unique experiences 
based on race, class, and culture in the development of their perspectives). 
 5. Just to name a few different types of feminist thought, there are Marxist 
feminists, radical feminists, postmodern feminists, standpoint feminists, eco-feminists 
and first, second, and third wave feminists.  At times, animosity exists between these 
branches.  See, e.g., JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS, MANIFESTA: YOUNG 
WOMEN, FEMINISM, AND THE FUTURE 219-21 (2000) (arguing that tensions arise because 
second wave feminists do not have enough respect for younger women in the 
movement).  See generally THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN 
OF COLOR, at xxiii-xxv (Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldúa eds., 2d ed. 1983) 
(explaining the different kinds of exploitation women of color experience in an 
anthology of essays and poetry). 
 6. GRANT, supra note 3, at 94 (describing the concept of a women’s way of 
knowing as derived from feminist standpoint theory).  This theory suggests that there 
is a distinctly “female” type of knowledge—a feminist epistemology.  Id.  Grant points 
out that a distinction must be made between a women’s way of knowing and the 
development of a feminist lens.  Id. 
 7. See SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM 136 (1986) 
(suggesting that feminist science or epistemology could exist as an “alternative mode 
of knowledge-seeking” that would defy the dichotomy that currently exists in society 
between males and females). 
2
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss3/1
2006] FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS 433 
My interest in intellectual property and feminist theory led me to 
investigate what might become visible if a feminist lens was applied to 
copyright and patent law.8  The goal of this paper is merely to probe 
several dimensions of feminist interpretation(s), not to be 
comprehensive, due to the complexity of both feminist literature and 
of intellectual property.  Given that there are multiple feminisms, I 
seek to map some of the possible contributions feminists can make to 
an understanding of intellectual property.9  This paper is divided into 
areas where the connections between feminist theorizing and 
intellectual property seem most salient.  Part I investigates feminist 
epistemology and the construction of knowledge.  Part II highlights 
the links between feminism, texts, and publication by looking at the 
gendered construction of authorship, as well as the way feminists, 
especially postmodern feminists, theorize about texts, and the possible 
alternatives offered by independent feminist presses. 
My early hypothesis was that feminist theory could be used to create 
a critique of expanding intellectual property rights.  However, I am 
not convinced all feminist theory, and by extension all feminists, 
would be equally critical of intellectual property.  That being said, my 
argument is that while some feminists may perceive benefits from 
copyright and/or patent law, feminist theory can make visible the 
underlying masculine assumptions existing in our construction of 
intellectual property as well as highlight a political economy of 
intellectual property that has historically benefited men more than 
women.  Furthermore, the value of a feminist analysis is that it can be 
                                                          
 8. The term intellectual property is much more recent than the underlying 
regimes of copyright and patent law.  See CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 18-19 (2005) (explaining that 
intellectual property as a concept was in use in the mid-nineteenth century, but not in 
common use until the twentieth century).  While the term is used to refer to 
copyright, patents, trademarks, and other generic regimes, it rests upon the 
assumption that intangible products are similar to tangible products and can thus be 
called ‘property.’  Id. at 18-19.  The term is not without its critics.  See, e.g., Richard 
M. Stallman, Confusing Words and Phrases that are Worth Avoiding, in FREE 
SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN (Joshua Gray, ed. 
2002), available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html#Intellectual 
Property (arguing that one should avoid thinking in terms of intellectual property 
because it conceals as much as it reveals about the underlying agreements). 
 9. A feminist analysis of intellectual property is currently underway.  In April of 
2004, Professors Anne Shalleck and Peter Jaszi of American University’s Washington 
College of Law brought an interdisciplinary group of scholars together to discuss the 
issues of gender and intellectual property.  The conference, “Mapping Gender and 
IP,” approached the subject from numerous angles—the role of women in fields of 
intellectual property law, the way judges interpret the law in a gendered manner, 
literary criticism, and many others.  See, e.g., Debora Halbert, Poaching and 
Plagiarizing: Property, Plagiarism, and Feminist Futures, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111, 111-20 (Lise 
Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (stressing the importance of a feminist 
framework to the future of authorship and the development of intellectual property 
law). 
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used politically—to think actively about what the future may hold by 
avoiding choices that privilege men more than women. 
I.  FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE  
In this section, I seek to map the ways feminist theorists have 
approached cultural production and developed a feminist 
epistemology.  Intellectual property scholarship and feminist 
epistemologies have proceeded upon parallel but unconnected tracks.  
Feminist scholars rarely, if ever, mention the words copyright, patent, 
or intellectual property; intellectual property scholars rarely, if ever, 
appeal to feminist interpretations to better understand the law.10  
However, while the words copyright and patent do not appear in the 
feminist literature, the ideas underlying these legal regimes are 
evident when feminists talk about the production of culture as male 
dominated, about how women have been excluded from creative 
work or have had their work appropriated by men, and about a 
feminist epistemology.11  Thus, by investigating the ways feminists 
theorize about the construction of knowledge, new insights into how 
intellectual property law has been developed upon gendered 
assumptions may become apparent.  These feminist theorists are 
typically not read with the idea of intellectual property in mind, but 
the connections between the two are clear.  While feminist theorists 
will be familiar with these thinkers, intellectual property scholars may 
not be, and I have chosen to outline the feminist arguments at length 
to make the links between both types of scholarship clear. 
Many feminist theorists discussed in this section, especially those 
seeking a unique women’s way of knowing, have been accused by later 
feminists of essentializing women by conferring on them a “unique” 
set of characteristics.  While I am sensitive to this critique, in this 
section I try to navigate between essentialism and what can be 
politically valuable about theories focused on a women’s way of 
knowing.  While I do not wish to reduce any individual to 
essentialized claims about his or her “nature,” it is possible to use this 
stream of feminist theory to develop an argument about another 
world where both men and women can participate in a different type 
of cultural production and ownership—a world generated from a 
                                                          
 10. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 776 
(2004) (encouraging legal scholars to take an interest in the way feminism may help 
interpret the law and demonstrating the ways a feminist analysis can be applied to an 
understanding of trademark decisions). 
 11. See id.; see also Simone Murray, Deeds and Words: The Woman's Press and 
the Politics of Print, in 11 WOMEN: A CULTURAL REV. 197, 197-98 (2000) (discussing 
the male-dominated field of publishing and the need for increased female literary 
participation). 
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feminist standpoint.  By using these feminist theorists to make an 
argument about the future, instead of focusing on traits that are 
uniquely feminine, it becomes possible to move beyond essentialism 
and shed light onto the social construction of knowledge protected by 
intellectual property laws. 
A.  Early Feminist Theory and the Social Construction of Knowledge 
An important early contribution to understanding how feminists 
might interpret intellectual property can be found in the work of 
Shulamith Firestone.  Firestone published The Dialectic of Sex in 
1970, and her work is among the most important second wave 
contributions to feminist theory.12  While the terms copyright, patent, 
and intellectual property do not appear within the context of 
Firestone’s argument, she spends considerable time investigating the 
relationship between women, culture, and the construction of 
knowledge.13  Firestone’s argument is premised upon a dialectical 
relationship between men and women that influences all aspects of 
our lives from personal relationships to culture and science.14  Within 
this dialectic, she argues that contemporary society considers the 
feminine inferior to the masculine.15  Sex dualism precludes women 
from participating in “culture,” which is masculine space.16 
Culture is a masculine construction for second wave feminists.17  
According to Firestone, the role women play, from a masculine 
perspective, is at best indirect.18  Women “contribute” to culture by 
acting as the “raw fuel for the culture machine” by providing 
emotional support or inspiration for the cultural creation of men.19  
                                                          
 12. FIRESTONE, supra note 1; see also MODERN FEMINISMS, supra note 4, at 53-54 
(describing second wave feminism as concerned with reproductive rights of women, 
but aligning with first wave feminists to also unpack the concept of “woman”). 
 13. See id. at 176-91 (theorizing that a woman’s relation to culture is through 
men and, therefore, indirect and removed). 
 14. Id. at 172-73 (depicting graphically the scope of human history as seen 
through a gendered lens). 
 15. See id. at 178 (arguing that “[b]ecause cultural dicta are set by men, 
presenting only the male view . . . women are kept from achieving an authentic 
picture of their reality”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. The argument regarding the masculine construction of knowledge and 
history is reflected in the scholarship of contemporary feminists interested in 
understanding the underlying power structures associated with the evolution of 
Western thought more generally.  See, e.g., CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF 
NATURE: WOMEN, ECOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 152 (1980) (developing 
the argument that western history is premised upon the narrative of male supremacy 
over women and nature). 
 18. FIRESTONE, supra note 1, at 176 (arguing that women’s participation in 
culture has primarily been indirect and only direct if women act as men). 
 19. See id. (highlighting the importance of women as sources of inspiration for 
5
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Theoretically speaking, women stand outside, or on the periphery of, 
masculine creation.  If creative work, either scientific or artistic, is to 
be protected legally, it will on balance be the work of men.20 
If women seek to engage in cultural production, the dualism 
inherent in relations between the sexes requires them to do so on 
masculine terms.21  Women, for the most part, cannot see themselves 
outside a culture already “saturated with male bias.”22  This political 
economy of cultural creation and innovation disparages and 
marginalizes women’s contributions to culture.23  The process of 
scientific discovery is also constructed through the male gaze.24  Given 
that there is no neutral starting place for an examination of cultural 
creation, intellectual property law itself is premised upon assumptions 
of creative work favoring the male creator. 
Firestone’s argument opens up an interesting insight into the 
production of knowledge as a gendered practice.  Women can choose 
to participate on terms constructed by men, but these terms are 
considered neutral.  The production of knowledge is territorialized, 
and entrance is based upon gender.  Without a gendered analysis of 
how knowledge is constructed, women who choose to participate in 
knowledge construction are often branded inferior simply because of 
their gender.25  Feminist historical analysis suggests that women were 
systematically excluded from sites of production, and, as assorted 
crafts became masculine territory, women were not given the 
opportunity to develop knowledge in those fields.26  Culture and 
                                                          
men, especially in the field of art). 
 20. See id. at 176-77 (arguing that men set cultural standards). 
 21. See id. at 178 (asserting that women view the world in masculine terms 
because of the prevailing male culture). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. at 177 (commenting that few women have contributed directly to 
culture). 
And in those cases where individual women have participated in male 
culture, they have had to do so on male terms.  And it shows.  Because they 
have had to compete as men, in a male game—while still being pressured to 
prove themselves in their old female roles, a role at odds with their self-
appointed ambitions—it is not surprising that they are seldom as skilled as 
men at the game of culture. 
Id. 
 24. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 30-31 (discussing feminist critiques of science 
that stem from the systematic exclusion of women from participation in serious 
science). 
 25. See FIRESTONE, supra note 1, at 193 (stating that the absence of women from 
scientific discipline is often illogically attributed to some deficiency on the part of 
women). 
 26. See MERCHANT, supra note 17, at 152 (describing how throughout the 
sixteenth century women lost access to a variety of trades and crafts and the 
knowledge associated with their production).  Specifically, statutes that limited the 
numbers of persons engaged in baking, butchering, and fish-mongering denied 
6
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innovation as male territory is asserted and maintained using the 
circular argument that women by definition cannot participate 
meaningfully in knowledge or cultural production. 
Liberal feminists who argue for the equal participation of women 
often do so without questioning the underlying assumptions 
associated with how we construct knowledge.27  They argue that 
women can participate as men on male defined territory.28  However, 
it is necessary to dig deeper and understand the way in which 
knowledge itself is structured as masculine.  Women need to develop 
a way of seeing themselves not already defined by men.29  
Investigations into feminist epistemology help to uncover the power 
involved in the construction of knowledge by asserting that there is no 
“neutral” field of knowledge production and the status quo is by no 
means a universally applicable framework, but one of many possible 
avenues for knowledge construction.30 
When radical second wave feminists were constructing their 
epistemological arguments, they were in part attempting to create 
grounds for the construction of knowledge for and by women.31  For 
many early feminists, the construction of culture as masculine was a 
central claim.32  Clearly, this epistemological framework has 
implications for how we view the idea of intellectual property.  If the 
                                                          
women’s access to these professions.  Id.  By the seventeenth century, women had also 
lost control over brewing and were increasingly marginalized in midwifery as well.  Id. 
at 152-53.  This severely circumscribed women’s productive opportunities.  Id.; see 
also FIRESTONE, supra note 1, at 192-93 (noting the lack of women at all levels of the 
scientific disciplines). 
 27. JANICE  MCLAUGHLIN, FEMINIST SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATES AND DIALOGUES 25 (2003) (arguing that during the second wave of feminism 
feminists began criticizing liberal feminists as privileging “masculine ways of being”; 
see also GRANT, supra note 4, at 18 (quoting Jean Bethke Elshtain, who characterizes 
second wave liberal feminists as asking the question, “Why can’t women be more like 
men?”). 
 28. KATHY E. FERGUSON, THE MAN QUESTION: VISIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY IN FEMINIST 
THEORY 26 (1993) (describing the conflict between liberal and radical feminists as 
one between trying to integrate women into already existing institutions versus trying 
to change those institutions). 
 29. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 144 (stressing that self-knowledge for women is 
important if a feminist science is to replace the current culture of knowledge that 
exists). 
 30. See id. at 141-42 (identifying the various feminist epistemologies as possible 
avenues for providing alternate views of nature). 
 31. Second wave feminist Kate Millet demonstrates that understanding knowledge 
and culture as masculine constructions is not unique to Firestone.  See generally KATE 
MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS (Univ. of Illinois Press 2000) (1969) (arguing that one can 
only understand politics by examining gender relationships constructed within a 
system of patriarchy, an ideology that dominates our understanding of psychology, 
economics, family structures, and biology). 
 32. See VALERIE BRYSON, FEMINIST POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 198-201 
(2d ed. 2003) (observing that many of the early feminists, like Firestone and Millet, 
differed on many points, but agreed that knowledge has been constructed as male). 
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very construction of knowledge that is the basis for claims to copyright 
and patent protection is gendered, then what is protected is the 
outgrowth of a gendered system rendered invisible until a feminist 
lens sheds light on the politics of this otherwise “neutral” 
construction. 
The construction of culture, knowledge, science, politics, and 
public life as masculine is premised upon the public/private 
distinction significant in understanding the traditional place of 
women in the world.33  Feminists have done considerable work 
clarifying the dualisms of male/female and public/private.34  If, as 
feminists have argued, knowledge is constructed from a male point of 
view, then it follows that it must be possible to articulate a feminist 
epistemology—an alternative to a masculine epistemology that 
masquerades as a universal mode of being.35  These feminist 
epistemologies, according to Sandra Harding, “can be used to 
undercut the legitimacy of the modernist epistemologies, which 
explicitly ignore gender while implicitly exploiting distinctively 
masculine meanings of knowledge-seeking.”36  A women’s way of 
knowing is an alternative to a status quo premised upon an exclusively 
masculine tradition.37  Articulating a women’s standpoint is a political 
activity that provides us with a different understanding of creative 
work and how it should be protected by law. 
B.  Feminist Epistemologies and Seeking Alternatives 
There are several epistemological arguments that allow us to 
examine the construction of knowledge from a feminist standpoint.  
These are especially important for understanding what feminists 
might protect with intellectual property law and what remains outside 
the boundaries of protection.  Each epistemological starting point has 
some relevance to the issue of intellectual property and the 
construction of knowledge.38 
                                                          
 33. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL 
AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 4-6 (2d ed. 1993) (asserting that women have long been 
relegated to the private sphere while the public sphere has been seen as the natural 
space for men). 
 34. See id. at 201-04 (summarizing different feminists’ attempts to re-define the 
public and private spheres). 
 35. See generally HARDING, supra note 7 (concentrating on articulating a feminist 
epistemology and surveying feminist thought as it relates to feminist epistemology). 
 36. Id. at 141. 
 37. See GRANT, supra note 4, at 41-45 (describing the evolution of an 
understanding of knowledge as gendered). 
 38. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 142 (suggesting that the various feminist 
epistemologies provide understandings of nature that are lacking from a men’s 
perspective). 
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First, a feminist epistemology can be grounded in an examination 
of craft labor done by women.  Craft labor focuses on labor 
performed by women involving “caring”—the labor of the hand, 
brain, and heart.39  Women’s labor networks people together in social 
structures by moving beyond labor as a commodity to labor as an act 
of care.40  This predominantly female type of knowledge construction 
can be contrasted to “industrialized labor,” which is claimed to be 
primarily masculine in construction.41  Industrialized labor exists 
within a system of production that generates knowledge in the 
abstract sense, instead of placing knowledge within social 
relationships.42  Women historically have been shut out of the 
industrial system of knowledge production, a system that takes place 
in factories, laboratories, and research institutes.43  Masculine 
knowledge exists within a capitalist mode of production, dividing 
subject from object and knower from the known.  What men do for 
recognition, women do for love.44 
A second epistemological feminist standpoint argues that when 
knowledge is constructed as abstract and rational, a gendered 
dynamic is at work.45  This argument claims that the abstract and 
rational knowledge is associated with the masculine, while a relational 
                                                          
 39. See id. at 142-43. (developing the argument that the thoughts and practices of 
women scientists are examples of a distinct feminist theory of knowledge because they 
incorporate caring labor). 
 40. See id. (quoting Hilary Rose who describes women’s labor as “caring” labor). 
 41. See id. at 142 (describing craft labor as a unification of “manual, mental, and 
emotional” activity and, therefore, reflective of a feminist theory of knowledge). 
 42. See id. at 145. 
 43. See id. at 143. 
[F]eminist epistemology cannot originate in meditations upon what women 
do in laboratories, since the women there are forced to deny that they are 
women in order to survive, yet are still ‘by and large shut out of the 
production system of scientific knowledge, with its ideological power to 
define what is and what is not objective knowledge’. 
Id. 
 44. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23-24 
(1988). 
[F]eminist artists, historians, anthropologists have been the first to show 
concern and respect for the crafts of the midwives and grandmothers, the 
anonymous work of women's hands, the oral culture of women sitting in the 
kitchens, the traditional arts and remedies passed on from mother to 
daughter, the female culture never granted the reverence accorded to ‘high 
art.’  . . .  And so we can both take pride in all that women have done for 
‘love’—including the resourceful, heroic coping of ordinary women 
everywhere—and also ask ‘Why should women, and women only, work for 
love only?’ 
Id. (quoting ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE, 260-63 (1979) (citation 
omitted)). 
 45. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 148 (quoting Nancy Hartstock’s assertion that 
adult labor is divided between masculinity and femininity). 
9
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epistemology is associated with the feminine.46  It is important to 
recognize that feminists see this binary perception of knowledge not 
as an essential characteristic of women and men, but as a political 
construct that privileges one way of thinking and doing over 
another.47  A masculine social construction of knowledge means that 
women and men primarily participate in an already determined 
system framed by masculinity. 
The ability to define one way of knowing as the only way of 
knowing, or the best way of knowing, is a question of domination and 
power.  Many feminists want to deconstruct the power/domination 
relationship and suggest alternative methods for understanding 
relationships based upon reciprocal empowerment.48  A feminist way 
of knowing emphasizes the relationships built, rather than dominion 
over others.  It seeks to value multiple ways of knowing instead of 
privileging one over the other.  Thus, instead of replacing a masculine 
epistemology with a feminine epistemology, feminist scholarship seeks 
to transcend the binary altogether and create a new attitude towards 
knowledge that will value the abstract as well as the relational.  The 
construction of a women’s epistemological standpoint has political 
power because it makes it possible to see that another way of thinking 
about the world is possible. 
The abstract and rational construction of knowledge can be 
interpreted psychoanalytically as well.49  This psychoanalytic approach 
suggests that masculine individuality is defined by what it is not—it is 
defined against women as the other.  Ironically, seeking to distinguish 
yourself from your mother is not motivated by “rational” behavior at 
all.  The feminist argument is that to move towards a successor to a 
masculine knowledge, is to move away from a knowledge constructed 
as “always defined exclusively against women.”50  Both men and 
women need to move away from the construction of knowledge as 
                                                          
 46. See id. 
 47. Joan Scott, Deconstruction Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of 
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 134, 134 (Marianne 
Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds. 1990) (arguing that we need to construct a feminist 
theory that allows us to “break the conceptual hold, at least, of those long traditions 
of [Western] philosophy that have systematically and repeatedly constructed the 
world hierarchically in terms of masculine universals and feminine specificities”). 
 48. See id. at 149 (summarizing Hartstock, writing, “[a]gainst power as 
domination over others, feminist thinking and organizational practices express the 
possibility of power as the provision of energy to others as well as self, and of 
reciprocal empowerment”). 
 49. See id. at 152 (arguing that “[w]ere women not exclusively the humans 
against whom infant males develop their senses of a separate and individuated self, 
‘human knowledge’ would not be so preoccupied with infantile separation and 
individuation dilemmas”). 
 50. Id. 
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“other” towards a reciprocal understanding of knowledge.  It is worth 
reiterating that such a move is not linked to women or men 
categorically, but is a standpoint that either women or men can 
appropriate in order to view knowledge in a different and, as feminists 
would argue, better and more constructive light.  The goal of 
investigating feminist epistemologies is not to argue that there is a 
superior female way of knowing, but rather is to contribute to the 
process of creating a “successor epistemology” that will lead to a 
gender-neutral construction of knowledge, where both women and 
men can function and where both women and men create their 
futures within a “degendered social order.”51 
How might these epistemological frameworks be related to 
intellectual property?  Two examples help highlight the values 
associated with women’s creative work and can lead to an alternative 
view of the way intellectual property may look from a gendered 
perspective.  The first example highlights the difference between craft 
and industrialized knowledge and illustrates the differences in 
knowledge construction.52  Knitting has long been considered a craft 
enterprise associated with women’s work.53  Virtually all knitters are 
women.  There is a long history of sharing patterns among knitters, 
knitting is often communicated from parent or grandparent to child, 
and knitting circles were a popular method of doing productive labor 
while enjoying the company of other women.54  Within the past few 
years, knitters have noticed changes in the world of knitting.  Where 
once patterns were published in easy-to-share formats with little 
concern for copyright, today’s knitting patterns come with strict 
prohibitions regarding sharing, copying, and producing knitted 
material for commercial purposes.55 
In other words, copyright has entered the world of knitting 
patterns, a world assumed by many involved as a communal source of 
knowledge to share.  Patterns have been appropriated into the larger 
                                                          
 51. HARDING, supra note 7, at 146. 
 52. Thanks to Hillary Warren in the Department of Communications at Otterbein 
College for suggesting this example. 
 53. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 142 (discussing the basis of Hilary Rose’s 
feminist epistemology, where an activity that engages the hand, brain, and heart is 
characteristic of craft labor and women’s work in general). 
 54. See generally Jean Rutter, Fellowship for the Fiber-Fixated, N.Y. TIMES, May 
27, 2004, at G4 (commenting on the newfound resurgence of knitting despite its long 
tradition). 
 55. See The Girl from Auntie, Copyright for Crafters: About the Knitter’s Guide 
to Copyright, [hereinafter Knitter’s Guide], http://girlfromauntie.com/copyright 
(last updated Dec. 28, 2004) (discussing the growing awareness of intellectual 
property rights among knitters and crafters and the increasingly complex legal issues 
that may arise from borrowing others’ patterns). 
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industrialized process of publishing for profit.56  It is now common to 
find regulations on what a pattern might be used for.57  For example, 
the pattern may claim that it can be used to knit a sweater for 
personal use but cannot be used to knit a sweater to sell.  These 
patterns also claim that one cannot share the pattern with friends, as 
so many patterns in the past were shared.  If some commercial pattern 
manufacturers have their way, used patterns will not be available for 
sale 58 despite the first sale doctrine.59 
While the knitting circles and community remain primarily female 
(public and shared), the ownership of knowledge about patterns has 
been appropriated into the dominant mode of production—it has 
been privatized.  Patterns are sold, not to further the culture of 
knitting, but to maximize profit.  As a result, much of the old 
community of knitting is being replaced with a marketplace of 
knitting, where knitters “steal” patterns if they do not each buy a 
pattern individually or if they use it in a way not deemed appropriate 
by the copyright owner.60  A feminine way of producing knowledge 
within the realm of craft has been replaced with a way of producing 
knowledge that emphasizes abstract originality and authorship in the 
production of knowledge, instead of the relations built into culture 
and custom. 
It is important to note that women (who need not be feminists) 
may operate in either paradigm and that many of those constructing 
these copyrighted patterns are women.  Feminists, however, would 
argue that the women’s way of knowing, illustrated by the tradition of 
                                                          
 56. See Halbert, supra note 9, at 113, 117 (noting that the American system of 
copyright, with its masculinized process and focus on profit and production, is in 
direct conflict with the communal ideas of property). 
 57. See Rutter, supra note 54, at G4 (noting the success by many knitting pattern 
creators, such as Bonne Marie Burns and Jenna Wilson, in selling downloadable 
patterns). 
 58. See Metafilter, Selling a Used Item as a Copyright Infringement?, http:// 
www.metafilter.com/comments.mefi/21960 (last visited July 26, 2006) (noting that 
some in knitting circles are troubled by knitting pattern and yarn design, and 
production company Alice Starmore, Inc.’s requests to Ebay that the web 
clearinghouse take down pages by knitters selling her used patterns and yarn); see 
also Virtual Yarns, Alice Starmore Classics, http://www.virtualyarns.com/ 
designs/classics.asp (last visited July 26, 2006) (detailing the inspiration behind her 
designs).  Ironically, Starmore’s designs are all premised upon the rich cultural 
heritage of her Scottish lineage and traditional Celtic designs; however, using the 
language of individual authorship and originality, she quickly ignores the traditions 
upon which she draws in favor of a language of private property based on the 
exclusion of others.  See Virtual Yarns, Design Showroom, http://www.virtualyarns. 
com/designs/default.asp (describing her approach to original design). 
 59. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (a) (providing control by the copyright owner over the 
first sale of a copyrighted item but limiting control over this item after the first sale).  
The first sale doctrine allows businesses such as used book and record shops to exist.  
Id. 
 60. See Knitter’s Guide, supra note 55. 
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knitting, should be used as the source for articulating and 
understanding a different method of constructing knowledge—one 
not contingent upon the abstract individual and original author, but 
one centered in relationships of care.61  After all, the pattern is only 
part of the creative process.  The individual who does the knitting 
makes changes to the design, picks the colors of the yarn, and invests 
her unique motivation into the knitting process.62  The creative act of 
knitting transcends the pattern; yet, as copyright invades and 
colonizes this space, its users attempt to appropriate for themselves 
the claim to original creativity and seek to control the activity well 
beyond the construction of a pattern.63  A feminist epistemology 
premised upon the craft mentality provides a standpoint from which 
to critique the method of producing (and consuming) knowledge 
exemplified by an industrialized and commodified process. 
Quilting provides a second example of “intellectual property” that 
developed outside the productive world of abstract authorship and 
within the framework of a network of sharing and care, thus 
illustrating the theoretical claims made by those endorsing a feminist 
epistemology.  Given that women’s stories are often excluded from 
“traditional” history, contemporary scholars have turned to unique 
places to understand the lives of women.  For example, one important 
source for understanding history, artistic, and cultural production and 
the development of what can be called a women’s way of creating can 
be found in the growing literature on the history of quilting.  Quilts 
are increasingly read as women’s history because the knowledge 
sewed into their patterns not only tells stories of the women who 
made them, but transformations in quilting also mark changes in the 
status of women over time. 
Sewing was an essential skill learned at an early age by the majority 
of girls and some boys.64  In the nineteenth century, quilt-making was 
just one example of women’s work considered essential to the 
household, serving very functional purposes.  Quilts were not assigned 
the status of “original” given that the primary purpose of quilting was 
                                                          
 61. See HARDING, supra note 7, at 148 (observing that it is women’s relational 
activity and approach to life that allows women to attain knowledge and information 
not accessible through “men’s characteristic activities”). 
 62. See Jenna Wilson, Copyright [A Primer for Knitters], http://knitty.com/ 
ISSUEfall03/FEATcopyright.html (last visited July 6, 2005) (noting that stitch 
patterns in a sweater, even in a traditional design, can be a copyrightable work of 
artistic craftsmanship). 
 63. See id. (explaining that knitting techniques are not protected by copyright, 
but that an author’s expression of those techniques can be copyright protected). 
 64. See PAT FERRERO ET AL., HEARTS AND HANDS: THE INFLUENCE OF WOMEN AND 
QUILTS ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 16, 26 (1987) (noting that sewing was an essential skill 
taught to children as young as two or three). 
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functional, therefore they could not earn copyright protection.  As 
the position of women within the household changed during the 
nineteenth century, so did the focus on sewing and quilting.  Even as 
most productive jobs were moving outside the household, the “cult of 
domesticity” prescribed sewing as an essential aspect of women’s 
work.65  Integral to the place of women in the home was the 
understanding that sewing was the essence of the “feminine.”  Women 
like Mary Wollstonecraft were considered “immodest” because of their 
work for women’s rights.66  By contrast, women who sewed were 
developing appropriate feminine skills and retained their sense of 
place.67 
Instead of simply providing functional blankets, women now also 
quilted more intricate patterns and designs.  These designs were 
taken from popular magazines and defined as works of “leisure” for 
women.68  Women who quilted became status symbols for their 
husbands because they had the time to spend on quilting instead of 
working.69  As the quilts became less functional, they certainly did not 
take any less labor.  Instead, the act of quilting was transformed from 
a vital function for the household into an activity to do in one’s spare 
time.  While remaining essential to “civilizing” the home, these more 
decorative quilts were not seen as works of original authorship.70  
Unlike early utilitarian quilt production, these more artistic quilts 
could be bought as kits, but there is no evidence they were treated as 
works of authorship in the same sense as literary works of the same 
period.  While these artistic quilts may have been displayed in the 
common living areas of a house in order to highlight women’s 
“leisure” time, they remained domestic objects, not serious works of 
art. 
Unlike the notion of the romantic author that had emerged to 
assert ownership of the written text, the culture of quilting remained 
collective and integrated into the everyday lives of women.  Women 
came together and developed friendships over quilts.  Multiple 
                                                          
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. (commenting that in the eyes of rural societies, “‘immodest’ women 
were those crusading feminists like Mary Wollstonecraft or Frances Wright who spoke 
in public and wrote books agitating for female equality”). 
 67. See id. at 26-27 (remarking on how the meaning of sewing changed from 
being that of a practical skill to a specific characteristic of femininity). 
 68. See id. at 27 (observing that the advice literature of the period promulgated 
sewing as a means to develop proper decorum in young girls, which included modesty 
and quiet manners). 
 69. See id. at 25 (explaining that decorative quilts emphasized the fact that 
women quilted for pleasure, not necessity). 
 70. It would be interesting to find copies of these original quilt patterns that 
could be purchased to see what the copyrights on the quilts might be. 
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women would work on a single quilt, thus confounding our modern 
understanding of authorship and possibly even joint authorship.  
Quilts were made as gifts for families and to commemorate special 
occasions.71  While it is possible to associate many quilts with their 
makers, the narrative of authorship of quilts is much less associated 
with the individual author than it is for literary texts.  Certainly, the 
creative work of a quilt is similar to that of any other form of 
authorship.  The designs reflect originality, and the sophisticated use 
of color to create the intended effect is an artistic talent.  However, 
their creation as collective projects, as gifts, and always with the intent 
of care, suggests another model for authorship. 
Quilts often include stories sewn into their squares, they utilize 
important knowledge of textiles and appliqué techniques, and they 
have served important political and cultural functions.72  However, 
their place as utilitarian objects, and as products of the work of 
women, has often meant that most are lost to contemporary history.73  
Additionally, because quilts were historically created within the 
culture of feminine sharing, issues of authorship were not associated 
with the abstract notion of author protected by copyright.  Certainly, 
women took great pride in the creation of these quilts, but these 
quilts existed within a different paradigm of ownership—one that 
attempted to solidify connections between people, not divide people 
by property boundaries. 
Both quilting and knitting, primarily women’s ways of creating, 
have existed outside copyright law and developed as collective 
enterprises, perhaps because the romantic author and the desire for 
profit were not central to the process of creation.  Examining these 
activities provides insight into how a world of creativity outside the 
realm of copyright law might exist, at least until the process of 
quilting and/or knitting becomes commodified and appropriated 
into a system of commercial production.  These noncommercial and 
sharing cultures need not be exclusively female.  However, because 
women’s work has historically been discounted as less creative or 
innovative,74 examples of sharing cultures are more likely to be found 
                                                          
 71. See PATRICIA COOPER & NORMA BRADLEY ALLEN, THE QUILTERS: WOMEN AND 
DOMESTIC ART, AN ORAL HISTORY 15, 17 (Texas Tech Univ. Press 1999) (1989) 
(documenting the quilting practices of a group of rural Texan women).  Many of the 
quilts produced by these women were specifically designed as gifts.  Id. 
 72. See FERRERO, supra note 64, at 47 (noting that “[i]n their narrative concept, 
format and technique, [the quilts illustrated on the adjacent page] clearly hark back 
to the traditional appliquéd tapestries of Dahomey in western Africa”). 
 73. See id. (praising Jennie Smith’s foresight in recording the description of a 
quilt maker’s firsthand account of her vision of the quilt). 
 74. See generally MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF 
COPYRIGHT 38 (1993) (noting that the historical perception of authorship, as 
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in female-dominated subcultures that have escaped 
commodification.75 
Arguments about feminist epistemologies are not meant to suggest 
that women as women will always see creative work as collective or an 
act of care.  Women can be as motivated by profit-making as men.76  
However, the feminist standpoint does suggest there are alternatives 
to intellectual property that can be used by both women and men 
who seek to escape what is often considered the only possible path to 
protect creative work—intellectual property law. 
The relational attitude becomes quite revolutionary when applied 
to the “products” of knowledge called “intellectual property.”  Once 
one stops privileging the abstract and rational and seeks out the 
relational in cultural creation and innovation, it is clear that a 
paradigm of intellectual property that creates rigid boundaries to 
sharing stands in the way of a relational approach to knowledge 
creation, one in which care and the work of the heart can play a role.  
A feminist critique from this perspective is a quite radical critique of 
the boundaries established by intellectual property law, which typically 
are boundaries that seek only to divide and control instead of 
facilitate exchange. 
The applicability of these epistemological standpoints highlights 
possible feminist interpretations of intellectual property.  If the very 
construction of knowledge is masculine, then it follows that the rules 
protecting the ownership of knowledge, such as patents and 
copyrights, emerge from a system of knowledge production that does 
not recognize reciprocity, but rather emphasizes the abstract and 
individuated male.77  Both women and men are alienated within such 
a system because the framework itself remains invisible.  However, the 
structure privileges masculine forms and disregards the type of labor 
and knowledge practiced by women until the time, as is the case with 
                                                          
exemplified in the paternity metaphor of the author as begetter and the book as 
child, was seen as belonging in the realm of masculine work and activity). 
 75. See generally Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, The Ethical Reaches of 
Authorship, 95 THE S. ATLANTIC Q. 947, 967-68 (1996) (discussing the foundations of 
the romantic author as premised upon individual creativity at the expense of the 
collaborative methods in which authorship is more likely to occur). 
 76. See DEBORAH LINDSAY WILLIAMS, NOT IN SISTERHOOD: EDITH WHARTON, WILLA 
CATHER, ZONA GALE, AND THE POLITICS OF FEMALE AUTHORSHIP 3-4 (2001) (noting that 
women writers did create huge profits for their editors and publishers as well as 
themselves); see also Natalie Danford, Feminist Publishing for Fun and Profit, 
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY Oct. 6, 2003, at 18 (indicating that women are responding to new 
competitive publishing environments, as exemplified by the Feminist Press). 
 77. See generally West, supra note 44, at 32 (noting that many radical feminists 
see the loss of boundaries, most often experienced by women, to be the source of 
oppression instead of something to value). 
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knitting, that a commercial value might be found.78  Both men and 
women can profit from the system of knowledge that feminists argue 
is a masculine construction, but the feminist standpoint allows us to 
build a bridge to an alternative understanding of knowledge and the 
types of knowledge that become valuable. 
Feminists argue that women’s labor “relieves men of the need to 
take care of their bodies or of the local places where they exist, 
freeing them to immerse themselves in the world of abstract 
concepts.”79  Thus, when a feminist lens is applied to the construction 
of knowledge, it becomes clear that isolated, original, and individual 
works of authorship are impossible—they come at the price of a 
gender dualism.  The move away from this particular social 
construction of knowledge requires us to understand these 
underlying principles. 
The social construction of knowledge is one possible feminist 
interpretation that helps us look at intellectual property differently.  
There are other avenues that may also be explored.  One such avenue 
is the substantial literature on women and authorship that has 
developed, which provides interesting feminist insights into 
authorship and ownership.  Additionally, postmodern feminism and 
the critique of texts available through a postmodern lens open up new 
avenues for a feminist interpretation of intellectual property. 
II.  WOMEN AS AUTHORS, WOMEN AS TEXTS 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of the 
author underwent a transformation.80  The focus shifted from the text 
to the author as original genius and authority of the work.  It was not 
uncommon for early texts to be published anonymously, either to 
avoid attribution of controversial political ideas,81 or because 
authorship was not seen as essential to the text.82  It was not 
                                                          
 78. See id. at 33 (commenting on the radical feminist perspective that no respect 
for boundaries, in terms of bodily integrity, is part of the problem women face). 
 79. HARDING, supra note 7, at 156. 
 80. See John Feather, The Commerce of Letters: The Study of the Eighteenth-
Century Book Trade, 17 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY STUDIES 405, 418 (1984) (commenting 
that there is still much to be learned about the status of authors during the 
eighteenth century). 
 81. See Rose, supra note 74, at 34 (providing the example of Defoe, who 
advocated for a law against anonymous authorship so those writing “offending books 
might be known and punished”); see also Feather, supra note 80, at 418-19 (arguing 
that the increased circulation of texts during the eighteenth century made it much 
more difficult for the state to act as a censor, especially as the book trade became 
more international). 
 82. See Lisa Maruca, Political Propriety and Feminine Property: Women in the 
Eighteenth-Century Text Trades, 34 STUD. IN THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 79, 82-83 
(2001) (arguing that another reason for anonymous authorship during the 
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uncommon for printers and booksellers to hire writers—either 
through discrete third parties or through their network of alliances 
within the trade—whose identities remained unknown to them.  
Although this did increase the bookseller’s liability because the chain 
of responsibility ended with him, it also increased his control over his 
investment, especially in an economic and legal climate in which views 
on intellectual property were changing.83  The professionalization of 
writing and the desire on the part of authors to monopolize revenues 
from the book trade helped change the ways in which authorship was 
constructed.84  As the late eighteenth century debates over perpetual 
copyright suggest, capturing the profits generated by works of 
authorship motivated many authors to make arguments about the 
nature of writing.85  Arguments regarding the author as the creator of 
original works manifesting a unique personality were made to justify 
copyright ownership.86  The primary sense in which authorship 
functions is by endorsing a system resting on the “conviction of 
ourselves as individuals.”87 
Interestingly, the language used to construct the romantic author 
took on a gendered quality, as did debates over who might be 
considered “authentic” authors versus “prostitutes of the pen.”88  Poet 
                                                          
eighteenth century deals with the better ability of publishers to control the work if the 
author remained unknown and thus not linked to what could otherwise be seen as 
their property). 
 83. See id. (observing that significant factors driving anonymous authorship were 
the economic and political implications surrounding the publishing process). 
 84. See ROSE, supra note 74, at 118 (suggesting that lying underneath the surface 
of eighteenth-century literary discussions of a writing’s worth was its commodity 
value). 
 85. See generally id. (describing the different approaches taken by authors to 
justify their perpetual ownership). 
 86. See SONIA HOFKOSH, SEXUAL POLITICS AND THE ROMANTIC AUTHOR 15 (1998) 
(proposing that the poet Samuel Coleridge was active in asserting a romantic form of 
authorship, which claimed writing as the expression of the creative and unique self); 
see also ROSE, supra note 74, at 137 (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion 
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), where the Court 
affirmed copyright protection for an advertisement containing a depiction).  In 
Bleistein, Justice Holmes reasoned that even if the depiction was a direct copy of a 
real performance, “[t]he copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature.  
Personality always contains something unique.  It expresses its singularity even in 
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible.”  Id. 
 87. See ROSE, supra note 74, at 138-39 (surmising that while legal fictions are still 
sometimes useful, it is the notion of authors as individuals which drives the whole 
system of copyright); see also Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary 
Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 314-15 (1992); 
Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 285, 288-89 (1992) 
 88. See HOFKOSH, supra note 86, at 16 (indicating that Coleridge’s question of 
literary property, while on the surface not a question of gender, is nonetheless a 
question that cannot be asked without also contemplating the question of what 
women want). 
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Samuel Coleridge was vocal about his interpretation of authorship 
and those not worthy of the title “author.”89  The construction of 
authorship and readers within the growing marketplace in books was 
explicitly gendered.  Coleridge found it important to create 
distinctions between authentic authors, like himself, and those who 
were tainted by the company of women.90  In making these 
distinctions, Coleridge sought to criticize those aspects of literary 
culture he did not consider of appropriate artistic content, primarily 
texts whose predominant audience (and often authors) were 
women.91  The distinctions created between authentic and 
inauthentic authorship premised upon the romantic notion of 
birthing original ideas was possible at that time, because a masculine 
sense of authorship was privileged and placed in opposition to 
“promiscuous company.”92 
Inherent in the discourse on literature and authorship throughout 
the eighteenth century was a concern about the feminization of 
literature.93  As literacy among women grew, and increased numbers 
of women took up the pen to write, women were met with resistance 
on the part of the male authors who resented and were threatened by 
the growing numbers of female authors.94  Literary societies, 
organized by women, and circulating libraries, used by both men and 
women, but almost exclusively associated with women, were thought 
to encourage promiscuity.95  It was thought that there was something 
inherently wrong with a woman who engaged in the circulation of 
texts or the criticism of these texts.96  If authorship as ownership has 
been constructed in the masculine terms of territory and original 
                                                          
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 18 (examining Coleridge’s objection to those features he deemed as 
differentiators in a writing career, “anonymous critics, newspapers, advertisements, 
and the ‘novels and tales of chivalry’ produced for and often by women,” that is, those 
features that are “reproducible and replaceable features of literary culture”). 
 92. See ROSE, supra note 75, at 38 (commenting on how even the metaphors used 
to understand authorship framed writing in masculine terms).  An author was 
“shepherd, tiller of the soil, vessel of divine inspiration, magician, and monarch.”  Id. 
 93. See TERRY CASTLE, BOSS LADIES, WATCH OUT!  ESSAYS ON WOMEN, SEX, AND 
WRITING 4-5 (2002) (explaining that throughout the eighteenth-century the notion 
that literary judgment was largely “a privilege reserved for men” prevailed and that 
women writers “represented a new and destabilizing force” in the marketplace). 
 94. See id. at 5 (suggesting that eighteenth century traditionalists saw the female 
critic as the “most blatant example of woman’s new and overweening literary 
ambition”). 
 95. See HOFKOSH, supra note 86, at 20 (discussing how libraries provided a forum 
for women to engage in “social gossip”). 
 96. WENDY WALL, THE IMPRINT OF GENDER: AUTHORSHIP AND PUBLICATION IN THE 
ENGLISH RENAISSANCE, 279-340 (outlining the problems faced by women who sought 
to write, including links between female writers and harlotry). 
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male genius, then the role women played as authors should be 
examined more closely. 
“Literature” was established as a male domain; great works of 
literature were not written by women—an idea only deconstructed by 
feminist literary critics in the past forty years or so.97  The gendered 
nature of traditional literature points to the role of women as “other,” 
the all-encompassing entity against which men act.98  I would argue, 
this sense of the other applies to any discussion of authorship where 
creative and literary work is assumed to be authored by men while 
women traditionally remained excluded from the canon.  In other 
words, there is a political economy of authorship that has a gendered 
component.  The following focus on gender, literature, and 
authorship helps highlight the importance of these issues for a 
feminist interpretation of intellectual property.  William Hazlitt, for 
example, published his first book, An Essay on the Principle of 
Human Action, claiming, “no woman ever read, or would ever 
comprehend the meaning of [it].”99  Joseph Hergesheimer wrote in 
1921, “literature in the United States was ‘being strangled with a 
petticoat.’”100  What is astonishing about quotes such as these is not 
the suggestion that women might be unable to understand the work, 
but that male authors feel the need to stake out territory in such a way 
that they hope to exclude women.  While such a statement reveals 
much about the male author and the need to establish legitimacy 
through superiority over women, it says little about women as scholars 
or readers. 
In order to succeed in a male dominated field, many women 
throughout the early twentieth century tried to assimilate into the 
already existing masculine culture.101  Historically, to be a female 
                                                          
 97. See TORIL MOI, SEXUAL/TEXTUAL POLITICS: FEMINIST LITERARY THEORY 54-55 
(1985) (arguing that it is important to evaluate how the concept of greatness in 
literature has often been used to exclude women from the canon).  Early feminist 
criticism focused on the literary works of men to highlight the pervasive inequality of 
gender relations.  Id.; see also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 199-253 (1989) 
(offering a feminist critique of the work of Montherlant, D.H. Lawrence, Claudel, 
Breton and Stendhal).  See generally MILLET, supra note 31 (offering literary critiques 
of D.H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, Norman Mailer, and Jean Genet). 
 98. See DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 97, at 197-98. 
He projects upon her what he desires and what he fears, what he loves and 
what he hates.  And if it is so difficult to say anything specific about her, that 
is because man seeks the whole of himself in her and because she is All.  She 
is All, that is, on the plane of the inessential; she is all the Other.  And, as the 
other, she is other than herself, other than what is expected of her. 
Id. 
 99. HOFKOSH, supra note 86, at 104. 
 100. WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 3-4. 
 101. See id. at 5 (arguing that Wharton and Cather attempted to transcend their 
gender in part by situating their own work within the masculine tradition). 
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author was to produce “mass cultural” objects, not to be an 
“authentic” writer, and female authors struggled to overcome these 
arbitrary barriers.102  An important conclusion that can be drawn 
from the gendered nature of the discussion over texts is that literary 
work and literary genius were initially only possible for men—a 
circular argument at best—therefore, the work of women was typically 
seen as second rate.103  In fact, earlier female literary critics were lost 
to obscurity.104 
Despite the articulation of original authorship, works of literature, 
and literary criticism as male territory, women today have entered the 
public sphere as authors and critics and have staked a claim to the 
title “author.”105  In doing so, women authors have both appropriated 
the already constructed masculine notion of the author as an 
individual creator and attempted to assert new modes of authorship 
and publication.  While often their works are denigrated as not 
“serious” literature, it is also the case that many female authors earn 
their living from a system of copyright established to protect the rights 
of authors.  While early debates over copyright protection were often 
framed in terms of male authors needing copyright in order to 
provide for their otherwise helpless wives and children,106 female 
authors can also benefit from the system. 
Female artists, operating under the authorial paradigm established 
in the seventeenth century, will seek to protect their “property” from 
improper use, will see these works as the extension of their 
personality, and will wish to be seen as the authors of their works.  
Thus, while some feminists may critique a system of property 
ownership in what has come to be known as “intellectual property,” 
other feminists who conceptualize themselves as authors may assign 
value to a system of property rights that protects their work.107  While 
                                                          
 102. See id. (postulating that for Nietzche and other turn-of-the-century male 
intellectuals, women were associated with the “inauthenticities of mass culture”). 
 103. See CASTLE, supra note 93, at 16 (noting that female critics, especially those 
who criticized male works, were also held in high disdain and seen as trespassers into 
masculine territory). 
 104. See id. at 20 (remarking that after 1800, literary criticism became increasingly 
professionalized and the territory of men). 
 105. See Shawn St. Jean, Hanging “The Yellow Wallpaper”: Feminism and Textual 
Studies, 28 FEMINIST STUDIES 397, 398 (2002) (suggesting that because some feminist 
writers have been provided with legitimacy as authors, it is time to focus upon 
defining “authoritative” texts more closely). 
 106. ROSE, supra note 75, at 40 (discussing the argument by London booksellers 
and authors that piracy was destroying their livelihoods and helping to develop a 
concept of authorial property). 
 107. Feminists may also wish to lay claim to the language of authorial genius and 
originality as St. Jean does when discussing the ways in which one ought to interpret 
Gilman’s The Yellow Wallpaper.  See St. Jean, supra note 105, at 398. 
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some feminists problematize the construction of authorship, others 
may suggest that owning property is itself an important feminist right.  
Because of women’s past (and sometimes present) position as 
property, it is likely that many feminists will advocate, at the very least, 
a theory of female economic and personal autonomy.108  
Furthermore, women’s autonomy may manifest itself in arguments 
about ownership of property and the creation of a sphere of bodily 
integrity.109  In other words, the ownership of private property, and by 
extension intellectual property, is likely to be equally appealing to 
contemporary feminists as it would be to men. 
However, one might also imagine feminist critics using the starting 
point of women as property to critique the notion of private property 
in favor of a less rigid understanding of ownership of tangible things.  
From this perspective, much as with copyright, it is possible for 
feminists to offer an underlying critique of the idea of private 
property that one day may transform a system of property that 
continues to work more in favor of men than of women.110 
In an effort to examine private property through a feminist lens, 
one could argue that the seemingly “rational” world of property 
discourse is in effect a story where not all actors can be predicted to 
behave in the name of rational self-interest.111  Specifically, women as 
mothers will most likely not order moral choices about property in a 
manner that will only benefit themselves to the exclusion of others 
(the otherwise “rational” choice).112 
                                                          
 108. See Bina Agarwal, Gender, Property, and Land Rights: Bridging a Critical Gap 
in Economic Analysis and Policy, in OUT OF THE MARGIN: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
ECONOMICS 264, 264 (Edith Kuiper & Jolande Sap eds., 1995) (arguing that land 
rights are a crucial part of women’s autonomy in South Asia); see also Renée 
Hirschon, Introduction: Property, Power and Gender Relations, in WOMEN AND 
PROPERTY- WOMEN AS PROPERTY 1, 17-19 (Renee Hirschon ed., 1984) (concluding that 
property rights are socially constructed and typically less available to women). 
 109. In many ways, arguments over reproductive rights are over bodily integrity 
and ownership of one’s own body. 
 110. See generally Hirschon, supra note 108 (pointing out that women generally 
have more trouble than men in obtaining property rights). 
 111. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, 
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 20, 28-36 
(Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing property discourse from a 
variety of perspectives, not all of which are motivated entirely by self-interest). 
 112. See id. at 31 (following Carol Gilligan’s groundbreaking work on moral 
development and introducing a character called “Mom,” who views scarce resources 
from a “cooperative” perspective according to which each person may take some, or 
“pretty much,” but not all of a resource); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
VOICE 95 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1982) (contending that women’s “morality” 
often includes concern or “care” for “both self and other”).  See generally SARA 
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINK: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 23 (Beacon Press 1995) 
(1989) (arguing that women’s relationship to nurturing and care-giving provides a 
kind of “maternal thinking” that cannot be calculated using what has been assumed 
to be a neutral and universal rational calculation of self interest). 
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Women’s interests in property can be viewed as seeking to avoid 
becoming the object of property and instead retaining the subjectivity 
to own property.113  This deontological position translates into the 
world of intellectual property.  Subjectivity as a potential property 
owner must be acknowledged.114  It is the dehumanizing forces of 
turning people into objects that must be resisted.  This is where a 
feminist critique can be made the most powerful.  At a secondary 
level, a feminist lens allows us to rethink traditional property in less 
absolutist terms and again seek a middle path and/or a balance 
between rigid ownership and total lack of control.115  Feminist 
analysis of private property may not reject the notion of ownership, 
but it does seek to render that idea more complex, multiple and 
linked to the larger public domain.116  Feminist presses offer an 
example of the problems associated with feminist concepts of 
authorship and property. 
The publishing industry has traditionally been male dominated and 
has led many feminists to seek alternatives to the mainstream 
publishing system.117  British feminists fighting for suffrage during 
the early twentieth century created feminist presses in order to attack 
the “patriarchal cultural hegemony by interrupting men’s discourse 
with each other.”118  During the pre-World War I period there were at 
least eleven feminist presses operating in London that focused on the 
cause of women’s suffrage.119  The most popular of these early 
feminist presses, The Woman’s Press, was forced to create new 
distribution channels after being vilified by the mainstream male-
dominated publishing industry.120  Despite their position, feminists 
understood the necessity of asserting their own narrative of women’s 
                                                          
 113. See Hirschon, supra note 108, at 3 (pointing out that in some cultures, 
women are considered “things” and “objects” and are “equated with wealth”). 
 114. See Agarwal, supra note 108, at 17-19 (noting that, at least for women in 
certain geographical locations, owning property is an essential part of women’s 
autonomy). 
 115. See Rose, supra note 111, at 28-36 (proposing such a compromise by 
introducing a “cooperative” perspective on property, which she illustrates through 
use of a female character called “Mom”). 
 116. See id. (discussing the “cooperative” perspective on property, which is more 
complex than others in that it incorporates a concern for others and a sharing of 
resources). 
 117. See Murray, supra note 11, at 198 (arguing that the American publishing 
industry and the process of creating literature as a legitimate pursuit was male 
dominated). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 199 (noting that evidence exists that “at least eleven pro-suffrage 
presses in addition to the Woman’s Press operat[ed] in London between 1905 and 
August 1914”). 
 120. See id. at 206 (remarking that political forces compelled the Woman’s Press 
to publish “non-fiction propaganda pieces”). 
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rights and successfully used commercial shops to sell suffrage related 
materials.121  Unlike later feminist presses that operated as not-for-
profit volunteer organizations, The Woman’s Press successfully raised 
money and generated profits.122  However, as later feminist presses 
would illustrate, the necessity of creating a voice outside the 
mainstream publishing world was integral to articulating a feminist 
worldview.123 
Feminists wishing to publish in the late 1960s and early 1970s met 
similar resistance to those writing in the early twentieth century.124  If 
feminist ideas were to be disseminated, alternatives to the mainstream 
press, still dominated by men, would have to be found.125  As the 
second wave feminist movement took hold in the 1970s, feminists 
constructed independent publishing houses in order to bypass the 
male dominated publishing industry and, what they saw as, the 
commercialization of the book market.126  These publishers relied 
heavily upon volunteer hours and collective organizational structures 
to distribute feminist texts and explicitly attempted to create an 
alternative paradigm for publishing materials.127 
Sybylla, an Australian cooperative feminist publishing house, 
describes its approach to publishing as, “a wilful disrespect for the 
values of commercial publishing.”128  The Feminist Press, begun by 
Florence Howe in 1970, saw its mission as publishing the “lost” texts of 
female authors—giving them voices that they otherwise would be 
denied.129  Authors publishing through these presses seemed to be 
                                                          
 121. See id. at 207 (asserting that the sale of pro-suffrage materials at commercial 
shops played a crucial role in the “suffragette campaign”). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Laura Furman, “A House Is Not a Home”: Women in Publishing, in 
SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL: AN ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS FROM THE WOMEN’S LIBERATION 
MOVEMENT 72, 72-75 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970) (arguing that publishing houses at 
the time were sexist and that women could not advance within the system). 
 124. See id. 
 125. See Leigh Felesky, Feminist Ink: Politics and Publishing in a Big Box World, 
HERIZONS, Summer 2004, at 46 (noting that the “niche” of “small presses” is to 
publish “voices” and views that may otherwise not reach a large audience). 
 126. See id. at 21 (recognizing some of the Canadian independent publishing 
houses—Press Gang, Women’s Press, and Gynergy Press).  Felesky also notes that 
large presses have recently bought some of these smaller publishing houses, while 
others have gone out of business.  Id. 
 127. See id. at 22 (describing volunteer hours as “the backbone of many feminist 
presses”). 
 128. Diane Brown & Maryanne Lynch, Creating a Space: Sybylla Feminist Press, 
1988- 2003, 29 HECATE 285, 288 (2003). 
 129. See Florence Howe, From Race and Class to The Feminist Press, 44 MASS. REV. 
117 (2003) (remarking that the “prime purpose of The Feminist Press” was to 
“recover and republish” the work of women authors); see also St. Jean, supra note 
105, at 397 (arguing that The Feminist Press was responsible for bringing Gilman’s 
The Yellow Wallpaper from relative obscurity into prominence as a feminist text).  St. 
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motivated by the necessity of expressing the ideas of feminism as 
much as, if not more than, benefiting from the commercial rewards of 
owning copyrights.  For example, when Press Gang Publishers, a small 
independent feminist publisher, closed its doors, it held a benefit to 
help pay the royalties due to its authors who had not been paid in 
three years.130  While I am sure these authors would have liked to see 
royalty payments, it is also the case that small feminist independent 
presses work for reasons other than profits. 
Feminist authors often desire their texts to circulate as widely as 
possible and to create a critical level of consciousness about feminist 
ideas.131  It is possible to argue that early feminists were more 
interested in seeing their ideas spread than they were in protecting 
their copyrights, an attitude that is not unique to feminists but may 
apply to any ideologically motivated group.  The explicitly political 
origins of Sybylla, organized as a Marxist feminist publishing collective 
run primarily by volunteer labor, suggest that providing an alternative 
to mainstream publishing that allowed women to publish their ideas 
was a crucial aspect of the inception of independent feminist presses 
in the 1970s.132  However, equally important to recognize is that while 
the demand for royalties may be tempered by the desire to have ideas 
published and circulated, the goal of making a living as an author is 
not without adherents in feminist circles.133  As feminist ideas become 
increasingly main stream and publishers see the market potential in 
feminist writing, issues of ownership may begin to transcend sharing 
ideas. 
Besides providing important avenues for publication by women, 
these feminist presses created new conceptual spaces organized upon 
different sets of values than those articulated in the mainstream press 
and codified as copyright law.134  While royalties and economic 
                                                          
Jean also suggests that the lack of copyright for The Yellow Wallpaper has led to 
numerous versions that are not the same, thus creating some room for argument over 
how to interpret the text.  Id. 
 130. See Felesky, supra note 125, at 23 (commenting on the necessity of “support 
from feminist media” and a “strong feminist readership” in preventing the closing 
and, thus, the silencing of feminist presses). 
 131. See id. at 46 (remarking on the fact that specific smaller, feminist presses have 
published works, and thus disseminated ideas, to which the public would not have 
had access to otherwise). 
 132. See Brown & Lynch, supra note 128, at 290 (observing that Sybylla 
maintained “a subversive presence in the broad marketplace” by advocating novel 
“ways of reading” and noting that this activity was “linked to the socialist-feminist 
politics of Sybylla’s past”). 
 133. See Felesky, supra note 125, at 46 (noting the need for everyone to buy books 
so that feminist authors may earn and living and continue to write). 
 134. See id. (providing an example of one set of values, those held by lesbians, that 
mainstream publishers and bookstores do not often recognize). 
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survival are not absent from these presses, the focus is much more on 
the exchange of ideas, creating an opportunity for political 
engagement, and the link to the larger community.135  In other 
words, they provide a balance to the simplistic view of property rights 
by recognizing the links that exist between author, publisher and 
reader.  However, not all feminist authors work within this system of 
independent presses, and thus their approach to copyright issues 
remains to be seen.  Whether feminist authors, by the nature of their 
feminism, hold a different approach to copyright and their texts is a 
question that can only be tested empirically.136 
Today, feminist independent presses struggle to survive.137  Because 
feminist ideas have, to some degree, become more mainstream, the 
market for small feminist presses is shrinking.138  As feminism 
entrenched itself in academia, it might also be argued that publishing 
within the traditional framework of the original author became 
increasingly important for reasons of tenure.  Thus, feminist literature 
today is produced through the same processes as any other literature 
and increasingly subjected to the same calculation—not of quality, but 
of sales.  Feminist writers want to see their works published through 
the “best” presses and reach large audiences.  Feminist presses have 
had to evolve to remain competitive.  Brown and Lynch document 
that Sybylla had to change its publishing strategies as feminist theory 
moved towards identity politics.139  Despite the many challenges, 
feminists dedicated to the ideas expressed through these presses 
continue to work to provide an alternative space to the mainstream 
publishers.140 
                                                          
 135. See id. (noting that one smaller, independent publishing house “is also 
dedicated to publishing books on timely feminist issues”). 
 136. See, e.g., Andrea Abernethy Lunsford, Rhetoric, Feminism, and the Politics of 
Ownership, 61 C. ENG. 529,  529-30 (1999) (discussing her own lack of proprietary 
feeling towards her writing and noting that many authors have a difficult time with 
the concept of “singular authorship”).  I, along with the feminist authors Lunsford 
mentions in her article, feel less proprietary towards my writing.  Other writers 
Lunsford has interviewed also attribute their lack of proprietary feelings over their 
writing to a feminist system that values collaboration and an acknowledgement of 
intellectual debts.  Id. 
 137. See Felesky, supra note 125, at 21 (observing that, at least in Canada, larger 
presses have bought several independent feminist presses, and at least one has 
closed). 
 138. See id. at 22 (quoting one employee of the Women’s Press/CSPI as saying, 
“[c]learly, the ‘F’ word is not such a bad word as it was when feminist presses opened 
their doors thirty years ago”). 
 139. See Brown & Lynch, supra note 128, at 290 (discussing how politics provoked 
changes in Sybylla’s publishing strategies). 
 140. See Danford, supra note 76, at 18 (observing that feminists are also changing 
to meet the new competitive publishing environments, as exemplified by the Feminist 
Press, which has reinvented itself through a new feminist pulp fiction series). 
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The advantage of a feminist perspective is that it provides a new 
lens through which to view copyright.  This feminist perspective can 
help raise the consciousness of women and men.  The issue of 
copyright has not been considered a feminist issue, and it is likely that 
some process of consciousness-raising is necessary to bring this 
approach to a wider audience.141  This paper suggests that a feminist 
critique of copyright is possible, even if many contemporary feminists 
benefit from the current system. 
If one were to create a feminist response to copyright, and by 
extension the idea of the romantic author, one might begin by 
arguing that the idea of author should be secondary to the circulation 
of texts.  Lunsford suggests that feminists are beginning to create a 
new theory of authorship focused on the connections between 
people, not the boundaries separating them.142  A feminist critique 
may begin with a critique of how texts are currently assessed—based 
upon marketability instead of the quality of the ideas.  In fact, while 
not specifically a feminist critique, highlighting the centralization of 
ownership and authorship into the hands of corporate owners is an 
important part of developing an alternative.143  If it were possible for 
the works of women to be valued to the same degree as the works of 
men, then feminism may debunk the very notion of an individually 
creative author and instead locate the text within the reciprocal world 
of ideas.  Such a position undermines the very concept of copyright 
that only conceives of the author as an individual and the work as an 
article of private property with clearly defined borders. 
A second possible feminist critique might join the postmodern 
critique of authorship illustrated by Foucault in his seminal essay, 
“What is an Author?”144  Foucault deconstructs what he calls “the 
author-function,” the illusion of the author as “authority,” the author 
as in control of the text in favor of the circulation of texts without 
authors.145  Some feminists recognize the importance of a de-
                                                          
 141. See Lunsford, supra note 136, at 532 (noting the sheer number of copyrights, 
particularly copyrights owned by corporate entities, in recent years). 
 142. See id. at 538-39 (noting that legal scholar Lani Guinier “situate[s] authority 
in the connections a person makes among the discourses available to her and out of 
which can come . . . a medley of component voices that is singular and plural at the 
same time”). 
 143. See id. at 532 (pointing out a “‘gold-rush’ mentality” that drives corporate 
entities “to copyright and patent everything under the sun”). 
 144. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, 
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 113 (Donald F. Bouchard ed. &  Donald 
Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977); see also JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT 
MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” (1993) (discussing Foucault’s link to 
“constructivism” and “human agency” and rebutting his critics). 
 145. See Foucault, supra note 144, at 124-26 (discussing how, with the advent of 
stringent property law, the “author-function” became one of “authority” and 
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centered author in part because there is no monolithic “self” from 
which the “author” works—this line of feminist analysis aligns with the 
postmodern move to call for the elimination of the author-
function.146 
Other feminists are less willing to eliminate the concept of the 
author because female standpoints and subjectivity (as well as women 
authors focusing on class and race) express important aspects of 
women’s experience that could not otherwise be articulated.147  
These feminist literary critics point to the seeming coincidence 
between the increasing importance of women as literary figures and 
the claim by male postmodernists that the author is dead.148  Some 
feminists find it suspicious that the idea of the author is lost just as 
women and people of color are arriving at legitimacy as authors.149  
Furthermore, given how easily corporate interests appropriated the 
author to cover the centralization of ownership under copyright law, 
it is very likely that theories regarding the “death of the author” will 
be appropriated into a world where the absence of an author allows 
for even greater profits for corporate entities that own copyrights.150 
To deal with the clash between the death of the author position and 
the need for autonomous feminist agency, a middle ground must be 
found.151  Two standards of authorship can help create the balance 
between the author-function and authorial agency.  First, literary texts 
have (rather than are) authors.  This idea suggests that the text is not 
the sole possession of the author and that texts, once written, are 
independent of the author.  Second, the fluid nature of subjectivity 
                                                          
propriety). 
 146. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBDIVISION 
OF IDENTITY (1990) (outlining a critique of gendered identity that destabilizes the 
notion of the individual as “naturally” gendered by developing the concept of the 
heterosexual matrix).  Butler does not take up the issue of the author-function.  Id. 
 147. See MOI, supra note 98, at 57-69 (outlining Gilbert and Gubar’s feminist 
argument that women’s writing is an expression of women’s experience and placing 
their argument in the context of Barthes’ and Foucault’s position that the author is 
dead). 
 148. See Cheryl Walker, Feminist Literary Criticism and the Author, 16 CRITICAL 
INQUIRY 551, 560 (1990) (expressing concern that in declaring that the author is 
dead, “post-structuralism” is not “meeting the needs of current feminism”). 
 149. See ELSPETH PROBYN, SEXING THE SELF: GENDERED POSITIONS IN CULTURAL 
STUDIES 34 (1993) (developing the argument that many women, especially women of 
color, found it problematic that the “death of the author” occurred just as they were 
gaining legitimacy in literature). 
 150. See Lunsford, supra note 136, at 532 (writing that “[m]ore interesting and 
alarming to me as a feminist and a rhetorician today, however, is the appropriation of 
the sovereign ‘author’ construct by the corporate world”). 
 151. See Walker, supra note 148, at 560 (contending that “what we need, instead of 
a theory of the death of the author, is a new concept of authorship that does not 
naively assert that the writer is an originating genius”). 
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means that authors can never be fully present in their work.152  
Additionally, a postmodern analysis that speaks to the death of the 
author is not seeking to eliminate subjectivity but to insert questions 
of power into textual analysis.153  The middle path allows for 
subjectivity and authorship but gives author limited authority over the 
text and its interpretation.  Authors should remember that the text 
belongs to the reader as well.  This critical analysis concludes that 
texts may not be the private property of their authors, but at the same 
time some authorial autonomy should be retained.154  A path 
between private property, where boundaries are established to 
prevent the circulation of texts, and pure textual circulation where 
the subjectivity of the author is ignored must be considered.  
Certainly, copyright law is structured to identify an individual author 
and provide certain rights to that author.  The law, which at least until 
recent additions skewed it towards ownership, provides some “rights” 
for readers, but perhaps not as many as it should. 
The feminist response recognizes the necessary relationship 
between authorship and the public.  In fact, by constructing 
authorship within the language of private property (or intellectual 
property), as is currently the case, we warp the relationship between 
public and private spheres in favor of the private and to the detriment 
of the public good.155  Writing, reading, and authorship are all public 
acts and as such should only be interpreted within the framework of 
the larger public good.  A feminist critique of copyright begins by 
seeking a true balance between circulation of texts and ownership of 
texts. 
CONCLUSION—WHERE DOES FEMINISM FIT IN? 
I have attempted to investigate the multiple ways feminist 
perspectives might be applied to intellectual property.  Women who 
identify with feminist thought may take any number of positions on 
the issue of intellectual property, from endorsing a system that 
protects the authorial autonomy of women, or, by contrast, offering a 
critique of the underlying assumptions of a property discourse 
                                                          
 152. See id. at 566 (interpreting the work of Cora Kaplan as arguing that 
“[a]uthors are never full subjective presences because of the fluid nature of 
subjectivity”). 
 153. See id. at 567 (noting that the discussion of the role of the author involves 
“politics and power relations”). 
 154. See id. at 571 (asserting that “[t]hough I may not wish to treat texts as the 
private property of their authors, I am unwilling to lose the sense of vital links 
between women that only a practice which preserves authors in some form can 
provide”). 
 155. See id. (discussing the link between authoring a piece and owning that piece 
as private property). 
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founded on a masculine construction of knowledge.  While work has 
been done on the history of authorship and the ways women were 
either ignored and/or used to define the boundaries of literary texts, 
much less has been done on the contemporary state of authorship 
from a feminist perspective.  Additionally, there is a need for a more 
direct feminist interpretation of the growing case law on copyright, 
patents and trademarks.156 
Feminism can provide a study of intellectual property with both a 
different viewpoint on the law and a method for articulating a 
different process.  The alternatives grow from the case examples of 
women’s creativity—quilting, knitting and feminist publishing to 
name a few.  These examples suggest that whether “natural” to 
women or not, a different relationship to creative work can be 
articulated from a feminist perspective.  This is an approach that 
recognizes collaboration as much as individual contributions, 
recognizes that the author (of a quilt, dress or book) and the 
reader/user form an important relationship often based upon mutual 
respect, recognition, and care, and that there is no need to construct 
a definition of literature or “high art” premised upon reactive 
boundaries that declare what good work is not—the work of women.  
A feminist perspective works at the foundation of the legal system by 
changing the assumptions upon which much of the law is based.  
Thus, there would ultimately have to be changes in the law that would 
reflect changes in the underlying social structure. 
The ultimate threat posed by the system of intellectual property, as 
currently conceptualized, is that it may further erode the values that 
can still be found in the types of creative endeavors that women 
produce.  We can hope that by understanding the alternatives a 
feminist interpretation makes available, at least some creative people 
will be provided with a cultural space where creation is about more 
than property rights.  Of course, a structural critique must be 
tempered by the fact that numerous women have turned the 
traditional system of intellectual property to their benefit.  In the end, 
much as in the beginning, it is difficult to see a single feminist 
interpretation applying here.  However, the many different 
interpretations create a more complex and richer dialogue on 
intellectual property, one that seems important to continue. 
 
                                                          
 156. See generally Bartow, supra note 10 (presenting some interesting work on 
trademark case law and suggesting that many trademark cases have been decided 
using a gendered lens). 
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